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The proposition of a regional security framework is presumably based on the 
following assumptions:
• That a region and its member states are agreed upon their defi nition as a 
region within certain geographical boundaries.
• That the member states of this certain region have certain common attributes 
which bind them together.
• That these member states can identify common threats.
• That they have a common desire to meet these threats on a regional basis.
This set of assumptions hardly applies to the Middle East. In some cases the four 
elements I mentioned are all absent. The Middle East has acquired several geographical 
defi nitions and none of them is helpful to this discussion, mostly because the 
geographical source of the threat does not necessarily correspond to the threats.
The geographical defi nition of the region relates to the region as the area between 
the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. This defi nition leaves Iran, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan outside the region. It also leaves the Maghreb, North Africa, outside the 
region. It is questionable whether Somalia or Sudan fall within this defi nition.
But when the sources of the threats to the region are mapped, it is clear that some
emanate from precisely those countries left out if the geographical boundaries contain 
just the space between the Gulf and the Mediterranean. This is not a simple matter 
because whenever the geographical size is increased, the looser the framework –
political, economic and security – become and the smaller the benefi ts are. That is to
say that if we add Pakistan and Afghanistan to the region because that is from where
some of the threats came from, the more diffi cult it will be to create a binding framework.
Regardless of the geographical boundaries of the region, the Middle East lacks 
the sufficient degree of political cohesiveness to allow for home grown regional 
security arrangements. There were, in the 20th century, attempts to create political, 
economic and even security frameworks, most of which have not succeeded. The 
ones in security were mostly attempts by the super powers of the time to create 
a buffer against one another. This is the origin of the pro-American, pro-British 
Baghdad Pact and this is the basis for the Egyptian-Syrian pro-Soviet alliance in 
the middle of the 1950's. The fragmentation of the Middle East continues and even 
deepens. Furthermore, regional frameworks require a certain degree of willingness 
to give up national sovereignty. It is difficult to produce a single country in the 
Middle East region which has reached the degree of political maturity to be able 
to forgo certain attributes of sovereignty. All of the regional, Arab associations 
in the region are of a loose, unbinding nature, where no sovereignty is given up 
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and pan-Arabism, which was a mighty political force just 40 years ago, is part 
of history.
Even more discouraging will be the attempt to defi ne, in a formal manner, the 
enemy. It is quite probable that in the inner courts, behind the scenes, even if Israel 
were to be present in these secret meetings, Iran or certain Moslem fundamentalist 
groups would be unanimously declared the common threat. This will not be done 
collectively in a manner suffi cient to forge a common framework to collectively combat 
this threat, or even to contribute to efforts conducted by other non-regional forces.
The combination of all these absent, but necessary, elements makes it almost 
impossible to create a regional security framework born from within the region 
itself. Not surprisingly, therefore, the two quite recent attempts to produce regional 
cooperation in these matters were initiated outside the region under the umbrella 
of NATO and the European Union. First was the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue 
which was launched in 1994 and now includes seven countries – Mauritania, Tunisia, 
Morocco, Algeria in North Africa and Egypt and Israel in the Middle East. The 
structure has been fl exible enough to allow two tracks. In the early stages, most 
activities were done in the context of the group and it developed to the extent 
that the seven Chiefs of Staff now meet annually with their NATO partners. The 
Foreign and Defense Ministers of the seven non-NATO countries meet as well and 
units of the seven Mediterranean Dialogue members may participate in certain 
NATO exercises. The second track, which was developed in recent years, is based 
on the principle of differentiality, which allows each of the seven to proceed in its 
cooperation with NATO according to its capabilities and wishes. NATO has reached 
Individual Cooperation Programmes with some of the seven MD countries, but at 
the same time the multilateral track is preserved. NATO's annual work programme 
for the MD aims at building joint activities in civil emergency planning, crisis 
management, border security and defence reforms and defence economics. The list 
includes seminar courses and exercises.
The weak and strong points of the Mediterranean Dialogue are clear. On the one 
hand, it is more an individual cooperation with NATO than a collective cooperation 
between two groups – NATO and a group of Mediterranean countries. But it is a 
fact, not to be disregarded, that in spite of the confrontation between Hizbullah and 
Israel in 2006 and Hamas and Israel in 2008-9, all the Arab States in the MD have 
continued their participation in the NATO MD activities including the meetings 
between high-ranking offi cers. The framework is of course partial and does not 
include Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority and the cooperation between 
the seven themselves is very minimal, but the MD creates a potential which could 
be further developed.
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An almost identical process was launched by the EU in 1995 at the Barcelona 
Conference and the Barcelona Declaration. The logic of this effort was similar to
the one of the NATO MD. The Iraq 1991 war and the 1993 Oslo Accords created 
regional political circumstances which were conducive to the establishment 
of regional cooperation. On the security matters, the Barcelona Declaration 
was "hijacked" by Egypt which has been campaigning against Israel's nuclear 
capabilities. The general security basket in the declaration is therefore heavily tilted 
in this direction. The two sentences which are directed to the issue of security are 
ridiculously vague and abstract. These sentences read "Promote conditions likely
to develop good-neigbourly relations among themselves and support processes 
aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and sub-regional cooperation.
Consider any confi dence and security-building measures that could be taken 
between the parties with a view of creation of an "area of peace and stability 
in the Mediterranean", including the long term possibility of establishing a 
Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end".
The Declaration of the summit of Paris on 13 July, 2008, creating the Mediterranean 
Union on the basis of President Sarkozy's idea, was basically a reiteration of the 
Barcelona Declaration and added platitudes. The annex to the Paris declaration 
specifi es six priority areas for the Union. None of them has to do with cooperation 
in security. One is called civil protection and deals mostly with catastrophes.
Simultaneously with NATO, the EU also reached, in 2004, the conclusion that 
an element of differentiality is necessary and the individual action plan offered to 
some of the EU Mediterranean neighbours was aimed at allowing them to progress 
more rapidly than the others in their bilateral relations with the EU.
It is clear from this short description that both NATO and the EU had very 
limited success in creating regional cooperation. Notwithstanding sub-regional 
security cooperation mechanisms such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, the failure to 
establish regional security is mostly the result of the regional states reluctance to work 
within mechanisms created outside the region and imported. But part of the failure, 
paradoxically as it may sound, is the result of a timid approach by NATO and the 
EU, which were willing to accept that the slowest and more reluctant Mediterranean 
partners will dictate the pace of the progress and the depth of the regional cooperation. 
Evidently, Arab-Israeli relations have been a major factor in the Arab attitude towards 
regional cooperation with Israel as an equal member and events in the peace process, 
both negative and positive, infl uenced Arab positions towards regional cooperation.
The analysis above does not mean that regional security cooperation is not 
possible even under the current circumstances. In spite of the experience of NATO 
and the EU, it is still an open question whether outside involvement is necessary. 
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The NATO experience is not totally discouraging. It shows readiness even under 
strained political circumstances, to maintain a certain degree of dialogue. It is 
evidence of willingness to accept a framework provided there is a suffi cient degree 
of fl exibility, allowing participants to proceed at their own pace.
NATO could try a bolder approach while attempting to use a fl exible approach. 
For the time being, it is the constraints which NATO imposes on itself which prevent, 
to a certain extent, greater progress towards regional security cooperation. The current 
efforts to devise a new strategic concept for NATO under the New Secretary-General 
and former Secretary of State Albright should, in my view, recognize not only that 
the Middle East and the area beyond produce both the sources of threats but also 
allies in meeting these threats. It is also evident that, at least for the time being, the 
region, regardless of its geographical defi nition, is unable to produce on its own 
a comprehensive system of collective security. What NATO can offer is a partial 
substitute through the creation of ad-hoc "coalitions of the willing". There cannot 
be, for obvious political reasons, a formal coalition against terror and certainly not 
against terror based on Islamic fundamentalism. There can be an informal forum 
in which even operational aspects can be discussed. The same can be said about 
Iran and its nuclear ambitions. It is a source of concern to every state in the Middle 
East. Again, for several reasons, this cannot be translated into a cohesive framework 
but informal discussion can take place.
Another aspect which should be looked at is the contribution of third parties to 
the security aspects of possible agreements between Israel and its neighbours. The 
past experience is not encouraging. The deployment since 1949 of UN Forces did 
not prevent wars and in 1967, the hasty decision to remove the UN force from the 
Sinai was a cause, though a minor one, for the outbreak of the war. International 
deployment will, however, be needed to fulfi ll certain functions. Ultimately it is, of 
course, the decision of the direct parties to the agreement to preserve it, but they 
may need third party involvement in terms of monitoring and maintenance of low 
level security arrangements.
In summing up, I would like to reiterate that the region as a whole still lacks 
the level of political cohesion necessary for a meaningful security cooperation. 
Sub-regions such as the Gulf and North Africa are better united at this point for 
cooperation. Connection between the sub-regions, creating a framework, providing 
a political umbrella and structuring the discussions can be provided by an outside 
organization such as NATO.
There is also room for low-key preparations for a third-party deployment in 
the context of security arrangements which will be part of the agreements between 
Israel and is neighbours.
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